Rodrigo „Rody“ Roa Duterte (* März in Maasin City, Leyte) ist ein philippinischer Politiker. Seit dem Juni ist er Präsident der Philippinen. Die philippinischen Präsidentschaftswahlen gewann Rodrigo Duterte mit 39% der Stimmen. Seit seinem Amtsantritt Ende Juni Der philippinische Präsident Rodrigo Duterte hat Obergrenzen für ausreisende Pflegekräfte eingeführt. Bischof Ruperto Santos kritisierte.
Kommentar: Rodrigo Duterte, der Mann mit dem HammerDie Duterte-Kritikerin Maria Ressa ist auf den Philippinen verhaftet worden. Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte wears a bulletproof vest and a helmet as he. Seit sind im Kampf des philippinischen Präsidenten Rodrigo Duterte gegen die Rauschgiftkriminalität zudem mehr als Rodrigo „Rody“ Roa Duterte ist ein philippinischer Politiker. Seit dem Juni ist er Präsident der Philippinen. Von bis , von 20und erneut seit war er Bürgermeister der Millionenstadt Davao City auf Mindanao.
Duterte Philippinen Early life and mayor of Davao City VideoPresident Duterte orders lockdown of Philippine capital Manila to fight coronavirus outbreak
Since Duterte took office in late June, more than 6, people have been killed in his campaign to purge the Philippines of illegal drugs and those associated with them, according to reliable estimates by local media.
The perpetrators are vigilantes, hired guns and likely cops too. Duterte made no secret that this would happen.
Under his leadership, the extrajudicial killings of suspected criminals and drug users in Davao by vigilantes was practically state policy. Survey data also showed a complex trend during the Aquino administration: fewer people were victims of crime, but more were worried about encountering drug addicts.
Under Duterte, the official estimates of drug use have increased significantly—suggesting that they were either understated before or are being overstated now.
Since the early s, there has been a growing awareness of the problem of narco-politics, mostly involving mayors and other local officials thought to be complicit in the drug trade.
Nevertheless, Duterte sees it differently. Although he was not the first presidential candidate to run against drugs and crime, he was the first to frame drugs as an existential threat and to be explicit about the brutal approach he would use to solve the problem.
Why has Duterte made illegal drugs his signature issue? In addition to viewing drugs as a cancer on society, there is an ugly political logic.
Combating drugs and crime was central to his reputation as an effective mayor of Davao City. Moreover, public acceptance of the Davao Death Squad, a shadowy group that specifically targeted suspected drug dealers, petty criminals, and homeless youth, showed the low cost and high returns of mounting an extra-legal war on drugs and crime.
The drug war also offers a potent and useful political narrative in which Duterte alone possesses the moral authority to rescue the country from the dangers posed by drug pushers and other criminals.
As Peter Kreuzer, a German researcher, has observed:. Given the assumed absoluteness of the evil to be combated, any criticism of the president has been silenced.
Detractors are suspected of being supporters of the criminal threat to society, and any reference to due process can be ignored. Public attitudes about the war on drugs.
Why is there such strong public support for the drug war? One explanation offered is that it reflects widespread disillusionment with the Philippine justice system.
However, the degree of alienation should not be overstated: few Filipinos ever go to court, and surveys indicate that the judiciary and the police both enjoy moderately high approval ratings.
As such, they do not deserve legal protections, rehabilitation, or empathy. This view might erode if the war on drugs expanded to target alleged drug users in the middle and upper classes.
A third explanation is that the drug war, despite its excesses, is seen as a welcome example of government responsiveness. It is rare for multiple government authorities—including the PNP, national government agencies, and local government officials—to work together to address pressing social issues.
This whole-of-government approach appears to have produced results. The PNP is the government institution most deeply involved in implementing the drug war—known locally as Oplan Double Barrel or Oplan Tokhang—and therefore most directly affected by it.
Although largely overlooked by most analyses, the PNP, and its predecessor the Philippine Constabulary, have long been at the nexus of politics, crime, and the rule of law.
As historian Alfred McCoy has shown, Philippine presidents and local officials have used the police as an essential tool to assert their authority, bolster their legitimacy, selectively fight crime, and control dissent.
Some of this corruption stems from individual greed, but it also is the product of low salaries, the complicity of politicians, and the multifaceted shortcomings of the justice system.
As mayor of a city that at times was wracked by political and criminal violence, Duterte considered the police to be a central pillar of his government.
He established close relationships with many in the police and gained an intimate understanding of how the police operate. Thus, it is not surprising that Duterte and the PNP have a symbiotic relationship.
Journalist Sheila Coronel describes the complex considerations that influence police behavior today:. Policemen weigh the continually shifting balance of incentives and risks as they seek to deter crime, advance their careers, please their political patrons, and make money, while also evading exposure and prosecution.
Yet in the end, these policemen often also believe they are upholding order and helping keep the peace. They are specialists in violence—practitioners in the skills of lethal force—who improvise often morally and legally questionable workarounds to the constraints of a broken justice system.
The longer-term consequences for law enforcement from the war on drugs may be highly damaging. Inducing police to engage in de facto shoot-to-kill policies is enormously corrosive of law enforcement, not to mention the rule of law.
There is a high chance that the policy will more than ever institutionalize top-level corruption, as only powerful drug traffickers will be able to bribe their way into upper-levels of the Philippine law enforcement system.
Moreover, corrupt top-level cops and government officials tasked with such witch-hunts will have the perfect opportunity to direct law enforcement against their drug business rivals as well as political enemies, and themselves become the top drug capos.
Moreover, assuming that eventually there will be a president who no longer sanctions EJKs by the police, the seeds have been planted for a potentially divisive and dangerous debate over how to handle human rights abuses that the PNP carried out during the Duterte era.
Other collateral damage. Impact on the justice system. The volume of cases to be investigated, prosecuted, and tried, as well as the number of alleged offenders awaiting trial in detention facilities, has increased dramatically.
A comprehensive picture of the impact on the justice system is beyond the scope of this working paper, but some of the available data point to these burdens.
Data from the Bureau of Jail Management and Penology, which oversees provincial and municipal jails, show an even more disturbing situation.
Ultimately, the legal dimensions of the war on drugs will test not only the capacity of the justice system, but also the jurisprudence, values, and autonomy of the Philippine judiciary.
In November , a Regional Trial Court issued the first legal judgment against the PNP, finding three policemen guilty of murdering Kian Delos Santos, a seventeen-year-old the policemen claimed was a drug runner who resisted arrest.
Impact on public health. As of mid, the Philippines had only forty-eight drug rehabilitation facilities and only about fifty medical personnel trained in addiction medicine.
The war on drugs has had predictable negative effects on drug-related public health problems. According to Vanda Felbab-Brown:. In prisons, users will not get adequate treatment for either their addiction or their communicable disease.
Impact on local politics and government. In many respects, subnational government in the Philippines is highly decentralized, but most local government units LGUs are dependent upon central government funding and grapple with the challenge of unfunded mandates.
LGUs are key actors in the drug war, and local officials need to juggle multiple and sometimes conflicting priorities, including protecting their citizens, cooperating with local law enforcement, and demonstrating results to central authorities.
And as reported by Rappler, a respected Philippine news website, the drug war has caused a major shift in LGU priorities:. At the local level, the drug war has changed the way barangays [the smallest LGUs] spend their funds.
Traditional social services such as medical clinics or feeding programs for malnourished children are no longer budget priorities. Through a number of policy incentives as well as strict supervision by the DILG, the priority at the barangay level has now become the monitoring and surveillance of drug suspects and the rehabilitation of drug users who have surrendered.
There also is a darker dimension to the drug war at the local level. Peter Kreuzer notes the pressure and intimidation experienced by local officials:.
The various reshuffles are placing more hard-line police officers in command positions. Furthermore, these officers are well aware that results measured in dead bodies are expected of them.
In addition, police officers and politicians alike have been publicly denounced as supporting and profiting from drug crimes and thus threatened not only with being indicted, but also with becoming victims of extrajudicial executions themselves.
Most officials then choose to fall in line with the president. But that is not the full extent of the damage being done to the Philippine polity.
Some observers of Philippine politics might argue that Duterte is only the most recent example of presidents who exercise fully the levers of executive power to advance their political and policy agendas.
In this light, he is perpetuating and perhaps perfecting the hardball politics that every president has practiced since But a deeper assessment shows that the Duterte presidency is qualitatively different from its post-Marcos predecessors because of its willingness to intimidate the opposition, weaken institutional checks, and discard democratic norms.
The Duterte presidency is fundamentally different from post administrations in its unrelenting use of intimidation to weaken any challenges to its authority.
Unlike previous administrations, Duterte and his supporters routinely use lawsuits, incarceration, and social media trolling to intimidate opponents and critics.
As sociologist Randy David has observed:. Compared to Ferdinand Marcos, Mr. Duterte has performed the art of intimidation with consummate skill.
Without warning, he calls out the name of his prey, denouncing him or her in the strongest possible terms, and publicly announces that he or she, or they, are in his line of fire.
The public has learned to take these instances of public vilification of targeted figures as part of the Duterte style of rule.
People know these are not empty threats. However, his statements and actions also send the message that no one is safe from his attacks and that opposing him is a high-risk venture.
As a former mayor, Duterte is used to governing by decree and by dint of his personality, popularity, and unrivaled authority.
In Davao City, he had no strong political opposition, significant institutional checks, or close media scrutiny.
Peter Kreuzer, writing in when Duterte was mayor , presciently observed:. Duterte makes abundantly clear that there can be security, but only he himself can provide it.
Security is provided according to his personal ideas of justice and adequateness. In his political symbolism, Duterte clearly is above the law.
It is him, who indicts, passes judgment and orders the executioners to do their job. It is a personalized fight between those who do not follow the rules and the rightful vigilante whose rules reign supreme.
As president, Duterte has repeatedly expressed his disdain for those who oppose his policies, and has taken numerous steps to silence his critics and weaken institutional checks:.
Moreover, Duterte and his supporters have demonstrated an impressive ability to put their opponents on the defensive.
They portray individuals and groups associated with the Aquino administration as incompetent or corrupt elitists. They accuse defenders of human rights of protecting drug peddlers and criminals.
A brief scan of the political landscape suggests that most institutions and actors that can serve as checks on Duterte are weak, divided, or under attack.
It is important to note that there is a typical arc of presidencies, which begins with high approval ratings, strong congressional support, and minimal opposition.
Following the midterm elections, the power of the president often begins to diminish as political and business elites position themselves for the next presidential election.
The senior leadership of the Armed Forces of the Philippines AFP has a tradition of generally respecting civilian primacy, but the AFP nonetheless influences politics and policymaking in a variety of important ways.
First, if there is a leadership crisis, like there was in January , following the aborted impeachment trial of then president Joseph Estrada, and the AFP chooses to withdraw its support from the sitting president, it virtually guarantees the end of that presidency.
Under Duterte, the role of the AFP in Mindanao has been elevated further with the imposition of island-wide martial law.
Third, the AFP has a strong say in determining national security policy. In recent years, the AFP appears to have become more professional and less political, but all presidents still cultivate the support of the AFP leadership.
Duterte has appointed numerous former officers to senior civilian positions in his government. He knows a number of them from when he was mayor, and he appears to believe that military officers will be more effective administrators and less prone to corruption than civilians.
He also wants to bolster support within the military for his national security policies, including negotiating with the communists and embracing China.
He has courted rank-and-file soldiers and police, visiting many military bases and raising salaries.
To date, Secretary of Defense Delfin Lorenzana and the AFP leadership have shown they understand the constitutionally mandated role of the military and are committed to military professionalism.
The AFP has avoided being drawn into the antidrug campaign, and to date the army appears to have administered martial law in Mindanao with competence and restraint.
However, given mandatory retirement ages, the senior leadership of the AFP changes fairly rapidly.
Therefore, routine leadership changes could bring to the fore senior officers who are more political. Some members of the military may likely object to his pivot to China, his willingness to negotiate with communist insurgents, and his fixation on the drug war.
Public opinion in the Philippines is frequently measured by credible survey firms and closely monitored by all politicians. As a result, public support for the president is an important factor in perceptions of presidential power.
Duterte has remained popular because he entered office with an energized base of support and because elements of his persona and policies appeal across socioeconomic classes.
What might cause public support for Duterte to soften? But as a term intended to categorize a particular approach to politics and governing, populism is frustratingly expansive.
When running for office, populists portray their political competitors as part of the immoral, corrupt elite; when ruling, they refuse to recognize any opposition as legitimate.
Using these criteria, Duterte certainly has some populist traits. His Mindanaowan roots, crass language, and brusque behavior set him apart from most of the national political elite.
In his campaign, he ran as a Manila outsider, and portrayed the members of the elite associated with the Aquino government as incompetent and corrupt.
Although he portrays himself as a political outsider, he is from a prominent political family and served as mayor of a major city for twenty-two years.
Even as he criticizes some members of the political and business elite, in practice he has allied himself with powerful members of the political establishment—most notably Gloria Macapagal Arroyo and the Marcos, Estrada, and Villar families.
Fear has now spread deep into the social fabric of society. Families and witnesses repeatedly refuted police accounts.
In some cases the victim never owned a gun or was too poor to buy one, family members said. In fact, when you see the report, it looks like a template.
In one case, police claimed Jovan Magtanong, a year-old father of three, fired at them, and that they recovered a. Witnesses said he was sleeping alongside his children when officers knocked on his house door asking for another man.
These lists effectively serve as guides for the police of people to arrest or kill. Amnesty International views these lists as unreliable, illegitimate, and unjustifiable.
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